CP Text - [Insert Aff’s countries] should distribute 50% of revenue received from oil and gas exports as a form of taxable income. Diamond and Mosbacher:

Larry Diamond and Jack Mosbacher, “Petroleum to the People:Africa’s Coming Resource Curse—and How to Avoid It”. Foreign Affairs, September October 2013. Quals: LARRY DIAMOND is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where he directs the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. JACK MOSBACHER is a Research Associate at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Given that reality, it is time to try a new policy approach, one that could drastically alter these incentives: the direct distribution of a portion of oil revenues to citizens as taxable income. In practical terms, this scheme would work as follows: **When a government received revenue from oil and gas exports, a certain predetermined proportion of it** (ideally, at least 50 percent) **would immediately be distributed directly to** the bank accounts of **the country’s citizens. Then, the government would treat those distributed revenues as income and tax some of it back. Each country could adjust the rate of taxation to transfer only that amount of cash that economists determined could be absorbed by the average poor family without fueling inflation or distorting incentives.**

Competition – The CP is competitive with the AC since the NC advocates for resource extraction, not environmental protection, then half the revenue from oil and gas exports would be paid to citizens of the country.

Advantage 1

The oil-to-cash approach would distribute a portion of the income to the citizens of the nation which would help people in their daily lives. Moss:

Todd Moss, Todd Moss is chief operating officer and senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, "Oil to Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers" <http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1424714_file_Oil2Cash_primer_FINAL.pdf)>

Importantly, **cash transfers would have immediate** and significant **economic benefits for poor households**—and ultimately for development. **Even a small amount of extra regular income can make a huge difference to the world’s poorest by enabling increased investment in nutrition, health, education and** even **microenterprise** (Case 2001; Yanez-Pagans 2008). **Providing** some **income security**, even if the payments are modest, **would allow poor households to avoid negative coping mechanisms like asset stripping**. Indeed**, it is hard to imagine any public services that would deliver an immediate income benefit of**, say 10%, **to the poor other than cash transfers.**

Advantage 2

And, the oil-to-cash approach increases governmental accountability, two reasons. Moss 2:

1. Incentives to tax. **[First,] After giving cash to its citizens, the state would treat it like normal income and tax it accordingly—thus forcing the state to collect tax revenues and build tax administration, rather than simply bypassing the taxpayers** by relying solely on rents. Although this initially sounds like an unnecessary step (why give something away that you are going to partly take back?), **creating incentives for tax collection and administration is perhaps the most important potential benefit of this scheme** (Devarajan, Le, and Raballand 2010). **Because the government must tax the oil revenue to recover some of it for public spending, the social contract is strengthened** rather than broken by natural resource revenues.5 **Governments will be forced to depend on the citizens for income, and consequently, citizens will have increased leverage and incentives to exert pressure on public policy**. 2. Incentives for accountability**. [Second,] Cash transfers from natural resource revenues would give citizens strong incentives to carefully monitor the incoming revenue, management of the resources, and how it is distributed. Because citizens would now have a direct personal stake in the resource**, **cash transfers would** likely **create** an intense constituency for responsible management and **demands for accountability. It is one thing to stand by quietly as oil reserves are mismanaged when the oil rents are kept in an offshore bank account** or are distributed as patronage to a select few. **It is quite another thing when the mismanagement of those oil fields threatens a direct source of income.** This was the primary purpose of the Alaska plan: to limit government waste by creating greater incentives for citizens to hold their governments accountable (Fasano 2000).

A2: No bank accounts

Diamond and Mosbacher

To many, the concept of direct cash transfers of oil dollars seems like a well-intentioned but utterly infeasible option. For starters, one might ask, how can countries that lack modern banking sectors or even national identification systems be expected to implement cash-transfer programs? The answer is that many already have. As Moss has written, as of 2009, some 60 developing countries, including Botswana, Brazil, India, Mexico, and Panama, have made regular direct transfer payments to approximately 170 million people. That success owes to recent advancements in affordable and reliable personal-identification technologies that use biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and facial and retinal recognition. Gelb estimates that as many as 450 million people in developing countries have had their biometric data cataloged. Although governments will need to invest in systems that allow them to properly and transparently transfer money into citizens’ accounts, new technology in the area of electronic banking is making this process continuously cheaper and more logistically feasible. Africa has experienced explosive growth in cell-phone subscriptions, now estimated at over 800 million, which, even allowing for users with multiple devices, means that the majority of Africans now have access to cell phones. Moreover, mobile-banking platforms, such as Kenya’s M-Pesa, are proliferating.